Consignment Sales Under Section 2-326
Of The Ucc by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 22 | Issue 1 Article 6
Spring 3-1-1965
Consignment Sales Under Section 2-326 Of The
Ucc
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation




CONSIGNMENT SALES UNDER SECTION 2-326
OF THE UCC
Section 2-3261 of the Uniform Commercial Code has filled an ap-
parent loophole in the common law of consignment sales. The section
fills a gap left by the Uniform Sales Act2 and by the pre-existing
case law and statutes in most jurisdictions.3 The common law consign-
ment sale is based on a combination of the concepts of bailment and
and agency under which a manufacturer places his goods in the pos-
session of his agent for the purpose of selling them to a third party.
Since ownership never vests in the consignee, the consignor is able to
retain, without recordation, a security interest in the goods, and re-
ceives other significant advantages from the delay in the transfer of
'Section 2-326 provides:
"(i) Unless otherwise agreed, if delivered goods may be returned by the buyer
even though they conform to the contract, the transaction is (a) a 'sale on ap-
proval' if the goods are delivered primarily for use, and (b) a 'sale or return' if
the goods are delivered primarily for resale.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), goods held on approval are not sub-
ject to the claims of the buyer's creditors until acceptance; goods held on sale or
return are subject to such claims while in the buyer's possession.
(3) Where goods are delivered to a person for sale and such person maintains
a place of business at which he deals in goods of the kind involved, under a name
other than the name of the person making delivery, then with respect to claims
of creditors of the person conducting the business the goods are deemed to be on
sale or return. The provisions of this subsection are applicable even though an
agreement purports to reserve title to the person making delivery until payment
or resale or uses such words as 'on consignment' or 'on memorandum.' However,
this subsection is not applicable if the person making delivery (a) complies with an
applicable law providing for a consignor's interest or the like to be evidenced by a
sign, or (b) establishes that the person conducting the business is generally known
by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others, or (c)
complies with the filing provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions (Article
9).
(4) Any 'or return' term of a contract for sale is to be treated as a separate con-
tract for sale within the statute of frauds section of this Article (Section 2-201)
and as contradicting the sale aspect of the contract within the provisions of this
Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202)."
'Both the "sale on approval" and the "sale or return" were treated under
Uniform Sales Act § 19(3).
ABut see Miss. Code Ann. § 273 (1957); Va. Code Ann. § 55-152 (repl. vol. 1959).
West Virginia had a similar statute, W. Va. Code Ann. § 4654 (1961), which was
repealed when the Uniform Commercial Code became effective on July 1, 1964. See,
W. Va. Code Ann. § 4654 (Supp. 1964). See also, Note, 27 Va. L. Rev. 962 (1941).
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ownership. At the same time, the consignor may fail to create a true
consignment relationship, with the result that the transaction will be
treated as an absolute sale to the agent, thereby subjecting the goods
to the claims of the agent's creditors.
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, General
Electric Co. v. Pettingell Supply Co.,4 held that the consignor of lamps
had no right to replevy the lamps from an assignee for the benefit of
creditors of the consignee. General Electric had consigned lamps to the
Pettingell Supply Company. Pettingell made an assignment of its as-
sets to Miller, an assignee for the benefit of creditors. General Electric
Company, in turn, replevied the lamps from Miller. The sole issue
presented to the court was whether, under section 2-326 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which Massachusetts has enacted,5 the goods con-
signed by the plaintiff, General Electric Company, could be subjected
to the claims of the creditors of Pettingell Supply Company.
The court held that -the plaintiff corporation had no right to re-
plevy the goods from the defendant's assignee because subsection
2-326(3) of the UCC specifically provides that a consignment sale is
to be deemed a sale or return, 6 and subsection 2-326(2) states that
such goods are subject to the claims of creditors of the buyer.7 General
Electric conceded that it was unable to bring itself within the ex-
ceptions provided in subsection 2-326(3) of the statute:8 (i) establishing
that the defendant was known by its creditors to be substantially en-
gaged in selling goods belonging to others,9 or (2) conforming to the
filing provisions of article 9 of the UCC.1° General Electric also con-
'199 N.E. 2d 826 (Mass. 1964).
"The Uniform Commercial Code is contained in chapter 1o6 of the Massa-
chusetts General Laws Annotated. The Uniform Commercial Code became effec-
tive in Massachusetts on October 1, 1958.
'The "sale or return" was treated by the Uniform Sales Act under § 19()(s).
"When goods are delivered to the buyer 'on sale or return,' or on other terms
indicating an intention to make a present sale, but to give the buyer an option to
return the goods instead of paying the price, the property passes to the buyer on
delivery, but he may revest the property in the seller by returning or tendering
the goods within the time fixed in the contract, or if no time has been fixed, with-
in a reasonable time."
7"(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), goods held on approval are not
subject to the claims of the buyer's creditors until acceptance; goods held on salt
or return are subject to such claims while in the buyers possession."
8599 N.E.2d at 328. Massachusetts does not have a statute similar to Virginia's
"Traders Act," therefore § 2-326(3)(a) was not a possible alternative for the plain-
tiff.
'UCC § 2-326(3)(b).
"0UCC § 2-326(3)(C). See UCC § 1-201(37) which defines a security interest. See
also UCC § 9-102(2): "This article applies to security interests created by contract
including pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's
CASE COMMENTS
ceded that the assignment for the benefit of creditors was valid if
the defendant's creditors were found to have claims under the section."
Consignment Sales Prior to the UCC
In concept, a consignment is a bailment to an agent with authority
to sell upon terms dictated by the wholesaler or manufacturer. 12 Title
to the goods is at no time in the consignee, but rather passes directly
from the consignor to the ultimate purchaser of the goods.' 3 Under
the terms of most consignment contracts the consignor is given un-
limited power to take back goods in the possession of the consignee.14
In return for the consignee's services as a sales agent, the consignee
retains a fixed percentage of the proceeds from each sale. The sale
price, less commission, is remitted to the consignor only after the
goods have been sold by the agent, since remittance at an earlier
time will generally convert the entire transaction into an absolute
sale to the agent.15 Because the consignor has reserved title to the
goods, he may retain through the use of express terms in the consign-
ment contract the privilege of himself making sales from the con-
signee's stock.' 6
The advantages running to the parties to the consignment con-
tract are numerous. 7 An untried line of merchandise may be market-
ed without requiring the retailer to expend limited funds. In addi-
tion, the consignor avoids the necessity of public recordation and the
lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, trust receipt, other lien or title retention
contract and lease or consignment intended as security." See generally Spivak,
Secured Transactions (Under the Uniform Commercial Code) (1963).
U1 9 9 N.E.2d at 328. Since General Electric had not availed itself of any of the
exceptions under § 2-326(3), the assignment for the benefit of creditors was valid
because the goods are treated, with respect to creditors, as a sale or return, placing
all incidents of ownership in Miller, the assignee.
1-E.g., Sargent & Co v. DeSoto Paint & Varnish Co., 768 Tenn. 247, 77 S.W.2d
444 (1935); General Electric Co. v. Martin, 99 W. Va. 519, 13o S.E. 299 (1925). See
4 Collier, Bankruptcy § 70.59 (14th ed. 1964); 2 Williston Sales § 338 (rev. ed. 1948).
22Rio Grande Oil Co. v. Miller Rubber Co., 31 Ariz. 84, 250 Pac. 564 (1926);
In re Taxes, 46 Hawaii 403, 38o P.2d 156 (1963); National Furniture Mfg. Co. v.
Price, 195 N.C. 6o2, 143 SE. 208 (1928).
uKemp-Booth Co. v. Calvin, 84 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1936); Reliance Shoe Co. v.
Manly, 25 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1928); In re Lexington Appliance Co., 2o2 F. Supp.
869 (D. Md. 1962); R. Carrillo & Co. v. McAlfee Bros. Furniture Co., 42 Ohio
App. 259, 182 N.E. 43 (1932).
"E.g., Tele-King Distrib. Co. v. Wyle, 218 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1955); Globe Sec.
Co. v. Gardner Motor Co., 537 Mo. 117, 85 S.V.2d 561 (1935).
"E.g., In the Matter of Wright-Dana Hardware Co., 211 Fed. 9o8 (2d Cir. 1914);
In the Matter of Prager, 173 F. Supp. 859 (D.N.H. 1958).
"See, Void, Sales § 64, at 330 (2d ed. 1959).
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possibility of having his goods subjected to the claims of the agent's
creditors.' 8 Recording is unnecessary because the consignor has not
released any property in which he must retain a security interest, since
he constructively retains possession through an agent. Finally, the con-
signor, by virtue of the fact that he remains the owner of the goods
until they are sold to the ultimate consumer, has an opportunity to
determine the retail price without contravening the federal anti-trust
laws.' 9 Resale price maintenance, when utilized through consignment
sales, was approved in United States v. General Electric Co.20 However,
this case has recently been limited by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
21
Because the consignment sale, absent a statute to the contrary,
does not require public recordation, creditors may be misled and so
find cause to challenge the transaction.2 2 Ostensibly the goods stocked
in the consignee's place of business are owned by the consignee; there-
fore unwary creditors may be surprised to learn that as to a large por-
tion of this merchandise, ownership lies elsewhere.
Cases testing the validity of particular consignments have gener-
ally arisen in one of the following situations: (i) creditors of the con-
signee levy upon consigned goods;23 (2) the consignee is adjudged a
'8Fowler v. Pennsylvania Tire Co., 326 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1964); United States
v. Menier Hardware No. 1, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 448 (W.D. Tex. 1963); In the Matter
of Prager, 173 F. Supp. 859 (D.N.H. 1958).
10Some decisions have held intended consignment sales to be invalid partially
because the consignee determined the price at which the goods were to be sold
to the consumer. See e.g., In re Wayside Furniture Co., 67 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1933);
Reliance Shoe Co. v. Manly, 25 F.2d 381 (4 th Cir. 1928).
-'272 U.S. 476 (1926). See also Klaus, Sales Agency and Price Maintenance, 28
Colum. L. Rev. 312 (1928).
"Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). This case involved a private
anti-trust case seeking damages. The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court of
Appeals and in a 5-3 decision held that "coercive" consignments were in violation
of the Sherman Act. Douglas, J., writing the majority opinion stated: "To allow
Union Oil to achieve price fixing in this vast distribution system through this
'consignment' device would be to make legality for antitrust purposes turn on
clever draftsmanship. We refuse to let a matter so vital to a competitive system
rest on such easy manipulation." 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964). Stewart, J., dissenting, was
of the opinion that the majority had impliedly overruled United States v. General
Electric. 377 U.S. 13, 29 (1964).
"Liebowitz v. Voiello, 107 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1939). See also Hawkland, Con-
signments Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Sale or Security?, Boston College
Industrial and Commercial L. Rev., Uniform Commercial Code Co-ordinator 395
(963); Hawkland, Consignment Selling Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
67 Com. L.J. 146 (1962).
"City of San Antonio v. Stieff, Inc., 83 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); General
Electric Go. v. Martin, 99 W. Va. 519, 130 S.E. 299 (1925).
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bankrupt;24 (3) a corporation which has acted as a consignee is taken
over by a receiver because of insolvency; 25 or (4) an attempt is made to
collect property or sales taxes from the consignee.26 Courts which are
called upon to examine the validity of a consignment arrangement
use no single criterion for reaching a decision, but rather scrutinize
the underlying intentions of the parties to assure that the agency was
not created merely to defraud creditors.
27
Consignment Sales Under the UCC
Section 2-326 of the UCC, like the other sections of the Code, has
abandoned the concept of title as a determining factor in deciding the
rights of parties to a contract, and has substituted a statement of the
legal consequences resulting from particular relationships. 28 This pol-
icy is demonstrated in the approach taken to consignment sales in
that terminology such as "on consignment" or "on memorandum" is
deemed to have no special legal significance which will immunize
property from the claims of a consignee's creditor. The Comment
states that "subsection (3) resolves all reasonable doubts... in favor
of the general creditors of the buyer."
The effect of subsection 2-326(3) upon consignment sales is clearly
illustrated by the result reached in General Electric Co. v. Pettingell
Supply Co., a case of first impression arising under this section of the
-'Ludvigh v. American Woolen Co., 231 U.S. 522 (iq13); Fowler v. Pennsylvania
Tire Co., 326 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1964); General Electric Co. v. Brower, 221 Fed.
597 (9 th Cir. 1915); In re Sachs, 21 F.2d 984 (D. Md. 1927); Harry Winston, Inc.
v. Levin, 13o So. 2d 717 (La. App. 1961).
'E.g., National Furniture Mfg Co. v. Price, 195 N.C. 602, 143 S.E. 208 (1928).
E.g., In re Taxes, 46 Hawaii 403, 380 P.2d 156 (1963); Department of Treas-
ury v. Ice Serv., Inc., 220 Ind. 64, 41 N.E.2d 2o (1942); City of Owensboro v.
Dark Tobacco Grower's Ass'n, 222 Ky. 164, 30o S.W. 350 (1927).
'Liebowitz v. Voiello, 107 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1939); Reliance Shoe Co. v. Manly,
25 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1928); Long Tobacco Harvesting Co. v. Brannen, 98 Ga. App.
142, 105 S.E.2d 390 (1958); Frick Co. v. Walter Cox Co., 1o Ind. App. 402, 199 N.E.
462 (1936); Tenela Oil Co. v. Blount, 368 S.V.d 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Best
Made Clothing Co. v. O'Brien, 145 Misc. 787, 262 N.Y.S. 56 (City Ct., Kings County
1932). See also, Note 26 Va. L. Rev. 8ig (1940).
--The Comment to § 2-101 states in part: "The legal consequences are stated
as following directly from the contract and action taken under it without resorting
to the idea of when property or title passed or was to pass as being the determining
factor. The purpose is to avoid making practical issues between practical men
turn upon the location of an intangible something, the passing of which no man
can prove by evidence and to substitute for such abstractions proof of words and
actions of a tangible character." See generally Hawkland, Sales and Bulk Sales
(Under the Uniform Commercial Code) (1958).
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UCC.29 The case is significant because it reverses the outcome which
would have been reached under the law prior to the adoption of the
UCC, where under the same facts General Electric could have replevied
the lamps consigned to Pettingell Supply Company.
Consignors of merchandise, however, can continue to enjoy their
former status by bringing themselves within one of the three excep-
tions to subsection 2-326(3). In states with Traders Acts, such as Vir-
ginia, consignors may continue to comply with these statutes, if they
were not repealed by the adoption of the UCC.3° In other jurisdic-
tions consignors will be required to comply either with the filing pro-
visions of article 9 of the UCC,31 or prove that the creditors of the
consignee had knowledge that the consignee was substantially en-
gaged in selling goods of others.
32
Subsection 2-326(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code, by requir-
ing the giving of constructive notice to creditors of the existence of
a consignment of merchandise, has removed the primary grounds for
a creditor's criticism of the consignment sale. At the same time, the
consignment sale has not been stripped of its usefulness as a business
device. The UCC has not affected the consignor's ability to set retail
prices, unless the consignor drafts his contract so ambiguously that
under subsection 2-326(l) the transaction is deemed to be a sale on
approval or a sale or return.33
The option given the consignor, of establishing that creditors of
the consignee are on notice of the existence of a consignment between
a principal and agent, appears to be a tenuous alternative in light of
the evidentiary problems that would necessarily be involved. For this
reason, the third alternative of filing in accordance with article 9
of the UCC seems the only satisfactory choice for most consignors in
the majority of states in which the Uniform Commercial Code is
effective.
STANLEY P. ArwooD
'This case is evidently the first case brought under § 2-326 of the UCC to
reach the 'highest court of any state. The section has been alluded to, however, in
United States v. Menier Hardware No. 1, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 448, 467 (W.D. Tex.
1963). Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp. v. Music & Television Corp., 339 Mass. 416, 159
N.E.2d 417 (1959).
-'See note 3 supra.
mSee note io supra.
3Even though a consignor complies with one of the exceptions to § 2-326,
it may be discovered that the transaction was in fact an outright sale and therefore
that the consignor had no security interest which could attach.
3Hawkland, Consignment Selling Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 67
Com. L.J. 146, 148 (1962).
